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Memorandum on the Administration of the African Protectorates administered by the Foreign Office.

IN view of the threatened criticisms on the Estimates for the African Protectorates, administered by this Department, it may be useful to recall briefly the circumstances in which the Protectorates were acquired, the reasons for their acquisition, the methods adopted, and the results obtained. Also to indicate generally, for the consideration of the Secretary of State, the lines on which we should, in my opinion, attempt to administer them in future.

The Protectorates are four in number, and taking them in the chronological order of their administration by the Foreign Office, are: British Central Africa, Uganda, East Africa, Somaliland.

British Central Africa.

This is the somewhat misleading name given to the Protectorate which lies to the south and west of Lake Nyasa. Attention was first called to the territory by the discoveries of Kirk and Livingstone in the early sixties. Missionaries and traders, mostly Scotch, followed in their wake, and by the time that the work of the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 had begun to make itself felt, a somewhat considerable number of these two classes had gathered near the Lake. The Portuguese Government commenced to interest itself in the district, but were forestalled by the declaration of a British Protectorate in 1891. Under the guidance of Sir H. Johnston, then Her Majesty's Consul at Mozambique, the way was gradually prepared for an organized administration; but success was not achieved without bloodshed and difficulty, owing to the opposition of the Arab slave-dealers, whose great hunting grounds lay around the Lake, and of those native Chiefs who profited by the trade. When these were overthrown, the rest was comparatively easy. No great native Potentate remained as an obstacle for the present or a threat for the future;

the British element was a reserve of force to the Administration, and a pledge of stability. The land had fallen to the Crown by the right of conquest, fortified by Treaties with such Chiefs as remained. The rivers Zambezi and Shiré afforded water communication with the Indian Ocean, and the Brussels Act of 1890, and the Treaty with Portugal of 1891, secured commercial and transit freedom. The land was then parcelled out to settlers, the rights of native occupiers being respected, and the Crown remained in possession of the rest.

Administration was organized under "The Africa Order in Council, 1889," under a Commissioner and Consul-General, with a staff of European assistants for the different Government departments; provision was made for judicial work; steamers were put on Lake Nyasa, and a military force was embodied. The total number of European employés, civil and military, now amount to 109, and the annual revenue has reached the respectable total of 52,000*l.*

The Protectorate marches on three sides with territory belonging to Germany, Portugal, and the Congo State, on the fourth with North-Eastern Rhodesia. The German boundary and part of the Portuguese have been delimited on the spot by Mixed Commissions, and no international troubles are anticipated from frontier questions.

The resources of the Protectorate consist chiefly of coffee and rubber: of the former, 1,100 tons were exported in the year ended March 31, 1900.

The great need now is for increased facilities for transport of produce. The question of a railway is under serious consideration; without it the Protectorate can hardly be expected to advance, and may even make a retrograde movement.

Encouraging though all the progress has hitherto been, the Protectorate has never been self-supporting, and has necessitated an annual call on Imperial funds of something like 30,000*l.* a year.

A question worthy of serious consideration is, whether the time is not at hand when the Colonial system of South Africa will spread so far north as to make it desirable to hand over the management of the Protectorate to the Colonial Office, though by so doing we should lose the credit of having reared so successful a child.

Uganda.

The Kingdom of Uganda was acquired for Great Britain by the enterprise of the late Imperial British East Africa Company, which sent up Mr. Jackson, now Deputy Commissioner in the Protectorate, in 1891, and forestalled the Germans in those regions.

The early history of the country was marked by internecine strife, caused by religious disputes, to which succeeded a mutiny of the Soudanese troops in 1897. The land is only just settling down from the disquiet of these occurrences. But a glance at the map is enough to show why our efforts at administration could only have met with partial success hitherto. We were forced by political reasons into the premature acquisition of a country lying over 700 miles from the sea, and surrounded on all sides by wild uncivilized tribes, dwellers in almost unknown lands, No transport but such as porters could afford, no access by water, no communication with the outer world.

That in these circumstances there has been lack of control, absence of definite local policy, irregularities in supplies, dissatisfaction, and mutiny is not surprising. The only wonder is that we have held the country at all, and that order is gradually growing out of chaos.

Probably the main difficulty of our earlier years was that of convincing the inhabitants that we had come to stay. One after another in quick succession our representatives fell victims to the hardships of the climate, and retired from the field. But times have changed: the railway nears the Lake, on which a serviceable steamer floats; the telegraph joins Uganda to England; and whatever disagreeable surprises the future may have in store for us, at least the natives know that our occupation is permanent, and the more enlightened ones are trimming their sails accordingly.

Our expenditure is necessarily heavy, but the Estimates show that two items are mainly responsible: military and police, which are unavoidable even in civilized countries, and transport—the latter is diminishing as the railway advances, and will soon disappear, except as a matter of railway account, so far as the country east of the Lake is concerned. But whilst it is quite fair to

treat this disappearance as a saving brought about by the achievement of the objects for which the transport was instituted, viz., a sure communication with the Lake, we must be prepared for its revival west of the Lake as we advance methodically towards the Nile. Against the expenditure, however, we can set off an increased revenue, At first, we got nothing out of the country, and were in the anomalous position of administering at the cost of the British taxpayer a country (the Kingdom of Uganda), of which the revenues, such as they were, all went to the local Ruler, who was usually in antagonism to us. The next stage was the introduction of customs, of which we took the proceeds, and now, since Sir H. Johnston's settlement, we have introduced hut taxes, trading and other licences, which bring in a revenue computed at over 50,000*l.* per annum. The Ruler and Chiefs are paid fixed allowances, and the basis of Government is established. Communications from the east are secured. The cutting of the sudd and the advance from Khartoum give access from the north, which will be rapidly improved, and will simplify our hold on the country and ameliorate the position of those serving in it west of the Lake.

The boundaries of the Uganda Protectorate are not absolutely defined: On the east it joins the East Africa Protectorate; to the north it stretches towards the Soudan, with no intervening foreign territory; on the west it touches the Congo State; and on the south, the German possessions. These boundaries have not yet been actually delimited.

The administration is carried on at present under the same Order in Council as that of British Central Africa, and with the same system of Commissioner and Assistants. The Civil European staff amounts to 86; there are, besides, 53 military officers and non-commissioned officers commanding a force of 1,116 black troops, 404 Indians, and 1,500 native police.

A new Order in Council will shortly be issued, assimilating the judicial and general system to that in force in the neighbouring East Africa Protectorate. In all the Protectorates, Regulations are made under the Orders in Council for the enforcement of law, order, and good government, embracing all the varying subjects which can be included under these headings.

East Africa.

Our direct administration of the East Africa Protectorate only dates from July 1895. It was taken over from the Imperial British East Africa Company, who had carried on the government since 1888, under lease from the Sultan of Zanzibar, and by Treaties with the interior tribes.

Our position in it is somewhat complicated by the fact that a strip of the coast is comprised in the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, where foreign Treaties run of a nature which tie our hands very closely as regards taxation and jurisdiction over foreigners. The attitude of France is the main cause of the continuance of the jurisdiction difficulty. Negotiations are proceeding. In the interior, when once beyond the Sultan's boundary (10 miles from the sea coast), our hands are free.

The Protectorate is manageable by reason of its sea coast and the railway, which traverses it; and though the Mazrui rebellion and the turbulence and treachery of the Somalis have caused us considerable military expenditure, the repression of disorder does not entail the same anxiety as in the distant Uganda Protectorate. Its boundaries have caused us little trouble: that to the south, where conterminous with German East Africa, has been marked out as far as Mount Kilimanjaro; to the east and north we fringe Italian and Abyssinian territory, and, so far, no questions have arisen. Unless, however, a satisfactory agreement can be come to with Abyssinia we may expect unpleasantness in the regions north-east of Lake Rudolf and the Boran country north of the Ogaden Somalis. The military expedition now progressing against the latter is too present with us to require more than a passing allusion here.

The Administration is carried on under the same system as in British Central Africa and Uganda, but under a different Order in Council, viz., "The East Africa Order in Council, 1897." The European civil staff consists of 69 members, and there are 19 military officers with a native force 1,000 strong. The reorganization of the whole military forces of the four Protectorates is, however, now under consideration, with a view to creating and maintaining a native battalion of sufficient strength and mobility to permit of its

being used, as occasion requires, in either Protectorate, thus obviating the necessity for demands on Indian military resources.

The progress in the revenue is not otherwise than encouraging, especially when it is remembered through what a time of unrest the country has passed; but it will be best to look upon East Africa and Uganda as one for the purposes of finance, as the boundary between them is purely arbitrary, and the allocation of duties optional and not conventional.

The question of the complete amalgamation of the two in the more or less near future will be gone into on Sir H. Johnston's return in the summer.

Somaliland

This lies on the coast opposite Aden, has a sea frontage stretching from the French possessions at Jibuti to within 150 miles of Cape Guardafui, and extends, roughly speaking, at its deepest point, 300 miles inland. It was taken over from the Indian Government by the Foreign Office in 1898 for reasons connected with our Abyssinian policy, and has hitherto been self-supporting. This year, however, the Imperial Treasury has been called upon to furnish a sum of 60,000*l.* to meet the expense of suppressing a fanatical Mullah. The progress of the French railway from Jibuti towards Harrar threatens the trade of Zaila, which furnishes a large proportion of the total customs revenue, roughly speaking (8,000*l.* out of 21,000*l.*). The severance from India has put an end to the possibility of obtaining temporary and economical assistance for the very limited European staff, and it would be dangerous to assert that the Protectorate will be able to hold on long without a grant-in-aid.

The budget for 1901–1902 shows estimated revenue of 32,900*l.*, and expenditure 32,389*l.*, but this does not take into account the sum of 60,000*l.* above alluded to.

The policy hitherto adopted in the Protectorate has been to deal with the tribes through their connection with the coast ports, where they come to trade, and to interfere as little as possible in their internal affairs. The policy is sound, but it may be difficult to continue it, as the tribes are gaining confidence in us and appealing to us more and more for protection a nst one another.

The value of the Protectorate to us appears to lie in the fact that from it comes much of the meat supply of Aden, and in its geographical position towards that settlement and the south of Abyssinia. The railway to Jibuti and the growth of that French town are, as has been said, the great elements of uncertainty as to the future prosperity of the Protectorate.

The following Table shows the estimated revenue of the four Protectorates for the financial year 1901–1902, and the percentage of its increase for the time during which they have been under Foreign Office Administration :—

Protectorate.	Estimated Revenue, 1901–1902.	Years in existence on March 31, 1902.	Revenue 1st year.	Increase per cent.
	£		£	
British Central Africa ..	52,785	9	21,500	145 *or 16·11 per cent. a-year.*
Uganda	52,050	7½	2,500	1,982 *264·27 per cent. a-year.*
East Africa	83,619	6½	18,500	352 *54·15 per cent. a-year.*
Somaliland	32,900	3½	22,000	50 *14·28 per cent. a-year.*

These figures seem to show very conclusively that we are developing new sources of revenue, and that we have done so under unfavourable circumstances is clear from a perusal of what precedes.

We may, in fact, fairly claim that the progress of our Protectorates in the last decade has more than fulfilled the aspirations of the assembled Powers as expressed in Articles I and II of the Brussels Act of 1890, when they enunciated the principles to be followed for the suppression of the Slave Trade and the amelioration of the condition of the natives. The Slave Trade has been suppressed; the amelioration of the condition of the natives proceeds more slowly, for they are ignorant and loth to learn; but the leaven of civilization is at work amongst them, and will surely produce its result in due time.

But whilst we can point with satisfaction to the foundations which have been laid, much remains to be added to the structure. We have been busy, and I think with some success, in creating so much of an effective administration as will enable us to deal with European settlers

and traders whenever they may come. We should now try and attract them. But first, we should have a clear idea as to where we want them, where they will be an advantage, and where a drawback, to the Protectorates.

As regards foreign complications there is, I think, only one quarter where we need feel anxious, viz., the frontier between Abyssinia and East Africa. We may have discussions with Germany and the Congo State as to the western and south-western boundaries of Uganda, but it is unlikely that they will be serious. We may, therefore, take our own time in developing our estates. But we must resist, as far as we can, the tendency common to all pioneers of pushing on into new regions before we have a solid base to start from. I think we should try to bring the natives to us, and not run after them. Concentrate, not expand. I feel sure that a few great centres where Europeans may congregate and set the example of European life and civilization in orderly healthy routine, must do more to spread the knowledge of our power and belief in our good intentions than the occasional presence of isolated and fevered young men or the harrying of so-called punitive expeditions. The natives of our Protectorates are for the most part a timid and unreasoning set, accustomed to ill-treatment from the "superior" races, and with all a wild animal's suspicion or ferocity. Let them find that we do not want to hurt them and that they cannot injure us, and before long we shall live in peace amongst them, and they will acquire some measure of civilized ways and wants.

The policy of concentration has been applied in British Central Africa and in Somaliland, and in each of these we have a solid base with no great demands on us for expansion. It is in East Africa and Uganda that we are being pushed on. I think it is inevitable that we must extend in Uganda towards the Congo State and the Nile Valley; but in the north-eastern portions of the Protectorate we can afford to take our time, unless Léontieff or other adventurers force our hand. So in East Africa: if we limit our responsibilities in Jubaland and devote our attention to the neighbourhood of the railway, and, perhaps, of the River Tana, and, of course, to the coast regions, we have some prospect of peace and prosperity.

The ideal objects of the advance of European nations into Africa have been well expressed in the Brussels Act already mentioned; they may be shortly summarized in two phrases:—

1. The welfare of the natives.
2. The promotion of commerce.

I have tried to show that what we have already done is tending to the welfare of the natives. Our punitive expeditions, though disagreeably frequent, have not been attended with the barbarity and devastation of the slave raids which we have abolished: they will serve to establish the *pax Britannica*, which cannot fail to lead to increased population and furnish more hands to labour. Our roads and railways enable us to bring supplies of food to starving peoples, and we have already in one instance materially lightened the evils of a wide-spread famine. Our missionaries are working under the ægis of the forces of the Government; our laws protect the native against the introduction of fire-arms and liquor; our medical men minister to their sick. There is much to do, but much has been done. Heroic measures, however, are not required.

As to the promotion of commerce I have always felt that it was premature to encourage settlers, except Indian petty tradesmen, or merchants to go into a country where we had a feeble administrative hold, and where the conditions of transport were such as to make export trade unprofitable and import trade so expensive, up country, that ventures could only spell ruin. But now these conditions are changed, for we have a strong centre with a comparatively large European population some 350 miles up the railway which now runs nearly to the Lake and will reach it in a few months; we have steam transport on the Lake, and in fact are almost as far advanced in East Africa in the matter of transport as we are likely to be for some time. We have, moreover, got judicial officers and Regulations enabling us to deal with crime and are in a position to welcome new-comers, if only we can attract them. Besides the deterrent reasons given above, it has always been felt that till we knew more of the country it would be rash to give large land grants, or long leases; there was, moreover, a doubt as to our legal position. This doubt has now been removed; we have a fairly accurate idea of a good deal of the country, and

we know that our lack of sympathy has discouraged enterprise in the interior as our reluctance to afford material aid has checked it along the coast. I would suggest that we might let it be understood that we are inclined to be more liberal in the future; that we will not be so very hostile to speculative adventures in the land, and that we will consider in a friendly spirit any commercial schemes for the development of the ports or country which may be placed before us; that we will give considerable land grants, and keep taxes and railway rates at a minimum.

In our Estimates for the financial year 1902–1903, I would also propose making more liberal provision for schemes likely to improve our knowledge and increase the production of the mineral and vegetable wealth of the Protectorates. For instance, the salary and expense of a geological or prospecting expert, and the cost of further experiments in the cultivation of cereals and of a study of the rubber-giving plants, might easily be recouped by results in the very near future.

The question of the civil and military staff is another one of importance.

We recruit for the administrative branches of the civil staff from persons recommended to the Secretary of State, and go to the Crown Agents for the technical or lower grades. We require no examination, and are therefore able to go to a somewhat cheaper market than if one were exacted. It is early to pronounce a definite opinion, but I think we are getting a good class of men. There is no lack of candidates. We offer pensions after ten years' service: none have yet been earned, But we suffer, and must continue to suffer, from a lack of posts in healthy climates, to which, to promote—granting that the highlands near the Victoria Nyanza prove to be health resorts, we obviously cannot send everybody to work there, nor can we expect men posted there to exchange to worse climates, with no attraction of pay or promotion. We cannot, therefore, at least in our present conditions, elaborate a regular African Protectorate Civil Service with interchangeable posts, nor indeed is it desirable to move a man from a country, of which he has learnt the language and customs to one where both are strange to him.

I think, therefore, we must try by finding good

houses, and, as far as possible, other necessaries of civilized life to make the actual posts in each Protectorate as healthy and attractive as we can. This means a rather larger building expenditure, but not necessarily increased salaries, though perhaps we may have to raise the initial pay.

The Leave Rules should be liberal, and based largely on climatic considerations. The "cuttings" of pay should be as few as possible, but allowances reduced to a minimum.

The military staff presents considerable difficulties: two are especially salient:—

1. The problem of attracting good officers of the regular army, to serve for a continuous period, with little prospect of fighting.

2. That of avoiding stagnation and indifference if we take another class, say militia officers, or promoted "rankers," who have no home career to fall back upon.

Possibly some scheme of graded salaries, with leaving gratuities, and not pensions, may be the solution; but the question is not an easy one.

A further question arises in connection with the military, and that is how far His Majesty's Government are prepared to discount expert military opinion as to the strength of the forces required; in other words, are we to keep up the military force to a "counsel of perfection" standard, or are we to keep it within moderate bounds and rely mainly on a mobile police force to nip in the bud any possible disturbances?

We have two good object-lessons now before us: the expensive operations at Kismayu, carried on on strict military lines, and those in Somaliland, where native irregulars are used against native tribesmen. The comparative results will be instructive.

(Signed) CLEMENT Ll. HILL.

May 14, 1901.

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